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Lump sum damages for personal injury are again under attack. Almost twenty years 
ago the concept of a structured settlement was imported into this country from the 
USA in order to provide continuing lifetime payments for seriously injured 
claimants.1 However, the idea was slow to develop. Proposals for a structure were 
easily defeated if either of the parties objected. Now, after lengthy consultation,2 that 
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1 R. Lewis, “Structured Settlements: An Emergent Study” (1994) 13 Civil J Q 18, R. Lewis, 
Structured Settlements: The Law and Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) chapter 4, and I. 
Goldrein and M. de Haas (eds), Structured Settlements: A Practical Guide (London: Butterworths, 
2nd ed 1997). 
 2 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Damages for Future Loss (Consultation Paper CP 01/02, March 
2002), and its Analyses of the Responses (CP (R) 01/02, November 2002). The Department made a 
shorter reference in its previous paper, The Discount Rate and Alternatives to Lump Sum Payments 
(Consultation Paper CP 3/00, March 2000). See also the Clinical Disputes Forum Discussion Paper, 
Lump Sum Damages and Periodical Payments (2000) and the report summarising the responses 
(April 2002). With structures in their infancy in 1994, the Law Commission considered it premature 
to give judges the power to impose periodical payments in Structured Settlements and Interim and 
Provisional Damages (1994, Report No 224) para 3.37 et seq. In a limited form periodical payments 
were recommended by the Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for 
Personal Injury (1978, cmnd 7054), chairman Lord Pearson (the Pearson report) vol 1 para 573. 
Earlier, reviewable periodical payments had been canvassed by the Law Commission (Working Paper 
No 41, 1971) but the response was so critical that the proposal was abandoned in its final report, 
Personal Injury Litigation: Assessment of Damages (1973, Report No 56). 
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veto has been removed by amendment of the Damages Act 1996.3 Taking into account 
the needs of the claimant, a judge can make a periodical payments order (PPO) even if 
it is against the wishes of both parties. The increasing judicial direction of the course 
of litigation has thus been accentuated. 
The tradition in tort damages is for there to be a clean break, with the defendant 
giving the claimant a once-and-for-all payment to end matters. In contrast, a PPO will 
produce an uncertain continuing relationship that may vary over time. This is because 
the periodical payments must be indexed against inflation - no matter what this 
eventually costs; and the payments can be set to continue for the claimant’s lifetime - 
no matter how indefinite. In addition, judges have been given new powers to arrange 
for awards to be varied, if necessary, long after trial. It is therefore not only the form 
of damages that has been changed but also the way that compensation is assessed. The 
result has been described as marking    
“the most fundamental change in 150 years in the quantification of bodily 
injury claims involving continuing losses. The changes will affect not only 
the level of damages awarded but will also require a new approach to the 
quantification of claims.”4  
This article describes this new approach to claims, and analyses the needs of the 
claimant upon which the legislation sets such store. The changes are set in their 
practical context by looking at their effect upon the bargaining process which lies at 
the heart of personal injuries litigation. Even though settlements, rather than trials, 
                                                 
3 The changes were made by s100 and s101 of the Courts Act 2003, but these sections did not come 
into force until April 2005, and revision of the Civil Procedure Rules and of the relevant Practice 
Directions did not take place until later that year. The most important of the delegated legislation is 
the Damages (Variation of Periodical Payments) Order 2005 (SI No 841). The tax position was 
updated by the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 731. 
4 London International Insurance and Reinsurance Market Association, Third UK Bodily Injury Awards 
Study (London: International Underwriting Association of London, 2003) 83. Colin Ettinger, the 
former President of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL), goes a little further by 
describing it as “the most important development ever relating to the law of damages” in (2005) 155 
New LJ 525. 
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account for the disposition of almost all personal injury cases, the effect of rule 
changes upon the negotiations between the parties has often been overlooked. In 
addition to this practical perspective, the article considers the wider economic and 
political context. In particular, it exposes as being seriously flawed the impact 
assessment upon which the legislation was founded. Although the changes will result 
in substantial cash-flow savings for the Exchequer and the National Health Service 
(NHS), they will cost insurers and premium payers dear. Those pressing hardest for 
the reform are revealed to be neither claimant nor defendant organisations, but 
Departments of State. By emphasising the effect upon public expenditure, the article 
thus exposes the political dimension of tort law, a feature which has often been 
overlooked. 
In spite of their importance, these changes have been implemented without 
apparent detection by academics.5 Tort scholarship is very partial. It is extraordinary 
how much attention is focused upon issues of liability as opposed to the quantum of 
damages. Practitioners are bemused by the pre-occupation of academics with the rules 
on fault: they are aware that liability is infrequently challenged by insurers - being 
raised as a preliminary issue in only about 20 per cent of their cases6 - whereas the 
                                                 
5 By contrast, there have been a rash of notes from practitioners. They include N. Bevan and H. 
Gregory, “Periodical Payments” (2005) 155 New LJ 565, G. Exall (2005) 149 Sol J 469, W. Norris, 
“Periodical Payments: Why We Should Bother” [2005] 2 Personal Injuries Bar Association Newsline 
7, C. Truscott [2005, March] Quantum 1, N. Bevan, “The New Periodical Payments Regime” [2005] 
2 Civil Court News 36, R. Cropper and I. Gunn, “Periodical Payments: Financial Considerations” 
(2005) 155 New LJ 1160, J. Stone and A. Sands, “Periodical Payments: the Need for a Pragmatic 
Approach” (2005) 15 (5) PI Focus 18, D. Brahams, “Periodical Payments for Future Financial Loss” 
(2005) 73 Medico-Legal LJ 77, and R. De Wilde, “Periodical Payments – A Journey into the 
Unknown” [2005] J Personal Injury Law 320. See also the detailed treatment in Kemp and Kemp, 
The Quantum of Damages vol 1 chapter 23. 
6 T. Goriely, R. Moorhead and P. Abrams, More Civil Justice? The Impact of the Woolf Reforms on 
Pre-Action Behaviour (London: The Law Society and the Civil Justice Council, 2002) 103. However, 
liability was more readily denied in another survey conducted by APIL, Potential Impact of the 
Threshold Limit for Personal Injury Cases within the Small Claims Court being raised to £5000 
(2005). 
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amount of compensation is almost always open to some negotiation. This article is the 
first discussion by an academic of these recent reforms in damages, and it goes a little 
way towards redressing the imbalance in tort scholarship. 
THE ATTRACTIONS OF PERIODICAL PAYMENTS 
Until 1988 damages at common law were always paid by means of a lump sum, 
never a pension. It did not matter that the compensation was for losses that might be 
suffered in the future: both the monthly wage that the accident victim may have lost, 
and the continuing costs of care that would have to be met, were compensated by one 
large payment. In recent years this lump sum system has been subject to increasing 
criticism. In particular, the enormous responsibility for safeguarding the future that it 
imposes upon a claimant makes it a very worrying means of obtaining compensation. 
As a result, a new form of payment via a structured settlement has made limited 
inroads into the lump sum. Since 1988 there have been over fifteen hundred seriously 
injured people who have received part of their compensation in the form of periodical 
payments.7 
The main advantages of a structured settlement, described in detail elsewhere,8 
form the rationale for the encouragement given to periodical payments by the new 
legislation. These payments offer claimants greater certainty and security compared to 
the traditional lump sum. They need not be eroded by the passage of time because they 
can be protected against inflation. They are not reliant upon uncertain forecasts of life 
expectancy because they can be devised to end only on the claimant’s death. They can 
even be guaranteed to continue beyond that date if there are dependants still in need of 
protection. They can relieve a claimant from the stress of having to invest and be 
                                                 
7 This figure is estimated by the author on the basis of various statistics supplied over the years by the 
major intermediaries in the field. 
8 R. Lewis “The Merits of a Structured Settlement” (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 530, and 
Lewis op cit n 1 chapter 6. See also Structured Settlements: Report of the Master of the Rolls’ 
Working Party (2002, chairman B. Langstaff), paras 6 to 20, and B. Langstaff, “Structured 
Settlements: Past, Present and Future” [2003] J Personal Injury Law 237. 
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responsible for a lump sum greater than most people will encounter in their lifetime. 
The costs of obtaining financial advice concerning investment of the damages can be 
avoided. In addition, periodical payments can be a very tax efficient means of securing 
continuing compensation,9 and they may preserve entitlement to means-tested 
benefits.10 From the state’s viewpoint, this form of payment is attractive because it 
encourages the spending of damages on the purposes for which they were awarded. 
The compensation is less likely to be dissipated as a result of mismanagement or the 
depredation of friends or relatives.11 The injured are then less likely to find themselves 
reliant in the longer term on the limited resources of the welfare state. This article 
later analyses the cash-flow benefits that can accrue to the Exchequer where public 
bodies self-fund periodical payments instead of paying out lump sums. It has been for 
a variety of reasons, therefore, that periodical payments have received the support of 
Government, law reformers, judges and, to a lesser extent, practitioners and their 
clients. 
However, further expansion of these payments in the form of structured settlements 
has been hindered in several ways. Some of these problems will continue to affect the 
use of PPOs, but one difficulty against which the new legislative regime mounts a 
frontal attack is the refusal by many lawyers to give proper consideration to the merits 
of the alternative form of payment. In part, this has been attributed to the innate 
conservatism of the legal profession,12 together with ignorance or misconception 
                                                 
9 See now the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 s 731 which replaced s 329AA of the 
Taxes Act 1988.  
10 Social Security Amendment (Personal Injury Payments) Regulations 2002, SI No 2442. 
11 See, for example, The Times, March 9, 2000, “Father used Half of Son’s £400,000 Payout.” 
12 “… lawyers and litigants are innately conservative, were wholly familiar with lump sum 
compensation and instinctively distrustful – and probably unfamiliar with – newfangled devices such 
as structures.” W. Norris QC, “Structured Settlements: Past and Future Developments”, paper 
delivered to the Legal Wales Conference, September, 2003. Similarly Lord Steyn could think of no 
substantial argument against judicial imposition of periodical payments other than “the distaste of 
personal injury lawyers for a change to a familiar system….” in Wells v Wells [1999] AC 345 at 384. 
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about what periodical payments actually involve. These doubts have proven especially 
troublesome when combined with reasonably held concerns about the value of 
structured payments compared to the anticipated returns on a lump sum when invested 
in equities. Although for some years it has been emphasised that lawyers have had a 
duty to consider setting up a structured settlement,13 in practice they have been 
examined only in a minority of the cases in which they could have been sought. For 
example, in 2001 - 02 the NHS paid over 500 claims in excess of £100,000 and yet 
less than ten per cent involved a structured settlement.14 For cases involving clinical 
negligence and dealt with by the Court of Protection in 2004-05 the take up was 
slightly higher, amounting to 26.5 per cent of the total.15 Sometimes structures have 
been raised as a possibility only at a late stage in the proceedings, by which time the 
claimant has become used to the idea of receiving a lump sum, and is suspicious of 
the change in approach. Claimants have therefore objected to the award. Defendant 
insurers similarly have had various concerns, although again most of them have 
lacked foundation. The result has been that, largely through inertia, the lump sum has 
retained its dominance. A major factor in this has been the ability of either of the 
parties to object and thereby defeat with ease any proposed settlement based on 
periodical payments.16 The recent legislation not only removes this veto but also 
forces lawyers to consider the merits of the new form of payment in any case likely to 
come to court. This does not mean that legal conservatism will no longer affect private 
settlements in the tort system, but it does constitute an attempt to change existing 
                                                 
13 R. Lewis, “A Lawyer's Duty to Consider a Structured Settlement” (1993) 9 (3) Professional 
Negligence 126. 
14 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Courts Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessment (November, 2002) table 
1. 
15 Personal communication to the author from Denzil Lush, Master of the Court of Protection. 
16 The need for the consent of both parties was affirmed as early as Burke v Tower Hamlets (1989) The 
Times, August 10, the case being criticised by Croxon in [1990] 3 AvMA Medical and Legal J 4. The 
point was reinforced by R v Liverpool Health Authority et al ex parte Hopley [2002] All ER 459 
discussed in R. Lewis, “Clinical Negligence and the NHS Refusal to Structure Settlements With 
Profit” (2003) 19 Professional Negligence 297.  
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culture. It is to the scope for imposing an award against the parties’ wishes that we 
now turn. 
THE SCOPE FOR COMPULSORY AWARDS 
If a personal injury case comes to court and involves future pecuniary loss, the 
judge has no choice but to consider making a PPO.17 An order can be made even if not 
requested or wanted by the parties or where they envisaged alternative provision.18 
The cases affected will usually be those involving serious injury where claims for 
future earnings or the cost of care are made. Although relatively few in number, these 
are much more likely to come before a court and be in the public eye. They are also 
where the claimant is likely to be in the most need and in the greatest danger of being 
under-compensated.19 Although the court’s power to make a PPO is limited, the threat 
of its use affects the bargaining position of the parties in most major cases. 
The power to make a PPO is limited in three particular respects. Firstly, it cannot 
be exercised in respect of damages for past pecuniary or non-pecuniary loss unless the 
parties agree. This means that only a minority of all claims in tort are in danger of 
having an order imposed because over ninety per cent involve only these two heads of 
damage and have no element of future loss.20 The typical claim is for a very small sum 
                                                 
17 Damages Act 1996 s 2 (1) as amended by the Courts Act 2003 s 100. 
18 As illustrated by the early case of Godbold v Mahmoud [2005] EWHC 1002 (QB), [2005] Ll Rep 
379. However, there was uncertainty about life expectancy, and neither counsel opposed the judge’s 
suggestion that a periodical award for care costs be made. 
19 For example, there is a likelihood that certain claimants will be substantially under-compensated for 
loss of earnings. R. Lewis, R. McNabb and V. Wass, “Court Awards of Damages for Loss of Future 
Earnings: An Empirical Study and an Alternative Method of Calculation” (2002) 29 J of Law & 
Society 406 and [2002] J of Personal Injury Law 151 and, by the same authors, “Loss of Earnings 
Following Personal Injury: Do the Courts Adequately Compensate Injured Parties?” (2003) 113 
Economic J 568. 
20 Future pecuniary loss was found in only 7.5 per cent of cases, and comprised only 8.3 per cent of the 
total damages paid in tort. See the Pearson Report op cit vol 2 para 44 and table 107.  
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of money21 and it will continue to be disposed of by means of a lump sum. The 
preponderance of these small claims in the system is reflected in the fact that non-
pecuniary loss accounts for about two thirds of the overall damages bill and past 
financial loss for about a further quarter.22 However, these percentages change 
considerably in serious injury cases when future loss becomes much more important. 
For example, it has been estimated that, on average, 83 per cent of a claim exceeding 
£250,000 against the NHS comprises future loss.23 In addition, it must be emphasised 
that these few serious injury cases are responsible for a substantial amount of the 
overall damages bill: in 2002 insurers estimated that although only one per cent of 
cases resulted in a payment of £100,000 or more, they accounted for 32 per cent of the 
total compensation received by claimants.24 It is in cases involving this level of 
damages, albeit a minority of all claims, where the new rules will have the greatest 
effect. 
                                                 
21 £2,500 was the median figure in the survey of 81,000 cases receiving legal aid and closed in 1996 - 
97 in P. Pleasence, Personal Injury Litigation in Practice (London: Legal Aid Board Research Unit, 
1998) 40 fig 3.17. In 70 per cent of successful cases the damages were less than £5,000, although the 
overall average was £11,000. P. Fenn and N. Rickman, “Costs of Low Value Liability Claims 1997-
2002” report average damages of only £3,000 for employers liability accident claims, although this 
study of almost 100,000 cases related only to claims for less than £15,000. See 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/majrep/claims/elclaims.htm .  
22 As found by the Pearson Report vol 2 table 107. The relative importance of non-pecuniary loss is 
reduced by two factors. First, as revealed by the report table 108, the larger the claim, the lower the 
proportion that is paid for non-pecuniary loss. Secondly, in more recent years it is likely that, at least 
in serious injury cases, the proportion of non-pecuniary loss has reduced because, for a variety of 
reasons, there has been a greater  increase in the level of damages for pecuniary loss. 
23 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Courts Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessment (November 2002) table 3. 
However, in table 8 the Association of British Insurers estimated that only 46 per cent of the value of 
claims between £100,000 and £250,000 comprised future loss. 
24 Ibid table 1. 
 9 
The second limitation upon the court’s power is that these new orders can only be 
made if the continuity of payment is “reasonably secure.”25 Legislation prescribes that  
the payments will be secure if either they are to be made by a Government or health 
service body,26 or if they are protected by a compensation scheme which guarantees 
payment in the event of an insurer’s insolvency.27 In effect, this means that orders can 
be made in the overwhelming majority of personal injury claims. One exception is that 
the Motor Insurers Bureau is not covered, but it has already been able to demonstrate 
successfully to a court that it is sufficiently secure for a PPO to be made in cases in 
which it is involved.28 Those against whom questions of security will be raised 
include Lloyd’s syndicates,29 the medical defence organisations, offshore insurance 
companies, and private self-insured defendants. Even in these cases, a PPO could still 
be made and the security requirement met if the payments were arranged via the 
purchase of an annuity from a life insurer which was covered by the scheme 
guaranteeing payment in the event of insolvency. 
The third limitation on the power to impose periodical payments is more important 
in practice. It is that it can only be exercised if the case comes to court for the judge to 
make the order. Even though cases of serious injury are more likely to come to court, 
                                                 
25 Damages Act 1996 s 2 (3) as amended by the Courts Act 2003 s 100. 
26 As specified in the Damages (Government and Heath Service Bodies) Order 2005 (SI No 474). 
However, there is concern that that an NHS body which becomes a Foundation Trust will not receive 
the protection offered by the NHS (Residual Liabilities) Act 1996. Test litigation on this issue is 
expected early in 2006. Rodway, “Periodical Payments Update” [2005] 6 Kemp News 10. 
27 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 s 213, discussed in detail in Annex C of the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, Guidance on Periodical Payments (April, 2005). Also acceptable are 
Ministerial guarantees under the Damages Act 1996 s 6. 
28 Thacker v Steeples and the MIB (2005, May 16) (unreported) (Lawtell Quantum AM 0900821) and 
[2005] 3 Kerp News 5, and Daniels v Edge and the MIB (2005) 15 (4) PI Focus 23.  
29 Syndicates are covered by the insurer insolvency scheme, but only in respect of policies written after 
January 1st 2004. 
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it remains the case that only a minority of them do so.30 It is true that the court will 
always be involved in cases involving children or patients unable to manage their 
affairs because then there must be formal approval of any settlement.31 However, in 
such cases the parties are effectively seeking an order by consent, and the legislative 
requirements of PPOs need not apply.32 This means, for example, that a wider range 
of annuities can be used. This is a tremendously important point, and one which 
hitherto many practitioners have failed to appreciate. Settlements out of court 
therefore can still take place in one of two ways. Firstly, there can still be private 
agreements to pay damages periodically. In effect, this means that much of the 
previous structured settlement regime survives, even though the use of that term has 
now been expunged from the legislation.33 Alternatively, if neither party wants 
periodic payments to be considered, there is every incentive to settle privately for a 
lump sum. No matter what the court might have considered to be the needs of the 
claimant, the parties will get their wish for such a deal if they keep their negotiations 
behind closed doors and avoid judicial involvement. 
                                                 
30 Before being set down for trial 98 per cent of cases are settled and many more are concluded before 
any hearing takes place. The Pearson Commission op cit vol 2 table 12. Similarly P. Pleasence, 
Personal Injury Litigation in Practice (London: Legal Aid Board Research Unit, 1998) at 12 reveals 
that only 5 out of the 762 “ordinary” cases with costs of less than £5,000 went to trial. However, a 
much larger percentage of serious injury cases end up in court. In cases involving very substantial 
awards of damages ten per cent of payments were found to be the result of formal court orders by P. 
Cornes, Coping with Catastrophic Injury (Edinburgh: Rehabilitation Studies Unit, 1993) 20. 
31 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 Practice Direction 21 para 6.6. In 2004 the Court of Protection approved 
settlements for “patients” in about 440 cases. Of these 45 per cent involved clinical negligence. These 
figures do not include approvals in cases involving minors. 
32 As confirmed in Day v Alexander (2005) 15 (7) PI Focus 24. 
33 Contrast Kemp and Kemp, The Quantum of Damages vol 1 para 22-000 stressing that structures “no 
longer have a separate identity as a form of final disposal in personal injury claims,” and that the 
chapter dealing with them is unlikely to appear in future editions. According to para 22–059 
structures “are now seen as being too restrictive in concept and application.” In several respects this 
is the opposite of what is argued here. 
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It would be a mistake to assume that because new legislation has been passed it 
will necessarily be used in the way intended by the draftsman. The legal rules provide 
a framework for bargaining between the parties, and the results can be very different 
from the picture of litigation envisaged by the black letter lawyer. Within the shadow 
of the new rules it is likely that a number of claimants will try to take advantage of the 
removal of the defendant’s veto: they will threaten to take the case to court and burden 
the defendant with a PPO involving uncertain liabilities unless there is agreement to a 
higher lump sum than previously was on offer.34 Exactly the same tactic has been used 
to obtain higher lump sums instead of provisional damages awards, as discussed 
below in relation to variation of payments. Somewhat less successfully, insurers may 
also use the threat of periodical payments to bargain harder with a claimant who is set 
on receiving a lump sum, or worried about whether the court’s assessment of needs 
will correspond to his own. Can a judge be trusted to leave enough of a contingency 
lump sum fund to provide for unexpected events? Claimants may also be concerned 
that even an index-linked settlement may not be enough to pay for their future care 
costs. Because of these worries bargains will be struck to settle out of court. The 
experience of other countries is that these deals have undermined the power to make 
periodic awards to such an extent that “lump-sum settlements have like termites 
reduced the rent system to but a hollow shell.”35 Because negotiations between the 
parties will water down the effect of the reform we can expect lump sums to be 
commonly used even in the majority of serious injury cases involving future financial 
losses. But the possibility of imposing a PPO substantially influences the bargaining 
position of the parties, and it is in that sense that all serious injury cases are affected. 
FACTORS AFFECTING THE TYPE OF AWARD: NEEDS DEFEAT 
WISHES 
                                                 
34 Similarly W. Norris, op cit n 5: “… claimants’ lawyers will recognise that periodical payments are an 
attractive means of providing compensation for long-term losses and a valuable bargaining tool even 
if there are good reasons for preferring a lump sum award.” 
35 J. G. Fleming, “Damages: Capital or Rent?” (1969) 19 University of Toronto LJ 295. 
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In any case involving future pecuniary loss the court must consider making a PPO. 
Whether it imposes such an order lies within its discretion and depends upon the 
particular facts of the case. The legislation offers only limited guidance about what 
might affect this decision. The most important consideration is the claimant’s needs.36 
Only in a Practice Direction is the court referred to the secondary issue of whether 
either of the parties prefers a lump sum and their reasons for doing so. The autonomy 
of the parties has thus been replaced by judicial assessment of what is good for the 
claimant. Introducing this measure of paternalism into this area of civil justice has 
raised no widespread concern given that, if it were not for the accident, the claimant 
would not have been able to have his future earning capacity capitalised into a lump 
sum.37 Nor will a claimant find it easy to avoid the effect of a PPO once it is made: 
any attempt to assign the value of the payments in return for a lump sum will have no 
effect unless a court agrees to the arrangement and finds special circumstances to 
justify it.38 The claimant is thus doubly protected against his own profligacy whether 
he likes it or not. 
The emphasis upon the claimant’s needs is novel: it is not to be found in earlier 
legislation dealing with damages. Need never affects compensation for lost earnings 
or pain and suffering, for example, although it is implicit in any assessment of housing 
or nursing care costs. Need is notoriously difficult to define,39 but focusing upon it can 
produce a different perspective upon an award. It contrasts with the usual objective in 
                                                 
36 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 r 41.7 as amended by SI 2004 No 3129. 
37 Law Commission, Structured Settlements and Interim and Provisional Damages (1994, Report No 
224) para 3.39, Lord Chancellor’s Department, Damages for Future Loss (Consultation Paper CP 
01/02, March 2002) para 24. In response to the latter, 57 per cent were in favour of giving the court 
the relevant powers and a further 14 per cent expressed qualified approval. Contrast R. Williams, 
“The Case against Periodic Payments” [1999] J Personal Injury Law 85 at 92. 
38 Damages Act 1996 s 2 (6). 
39 For the most recent assessment of the difficulties involved see M. Tibble, Review of Existing 
Research on the Extra Costs of Disability (Department of Work and Pensions, Working Paper No 21, 
2005). 
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tort of returning the claimant to the pre-accident position. In particular, as we shall see 
below, need requires a more detailed analysis of the claimant’s future than the tort 
system has previously attempted. 
Apart from need, the court must also have regard to the nature of any financial 
advice received by the claimant, and “the scale of the annual payments taking into 
account any deduction for contributory negligence.”40 This financial advice will rarely 
be that of the claimant’s own solicitor for the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 prevents such advice from being given by those who are not authorised.41 
Instead the court will require the opinion of an independent financial advisor. This 
will have to be sought early in the proceedings because, as soon as is reasonably 
practicable, the court is required to give the parties a preliminary indication of which 
form of payment it considers the more appropriate.42 Financial intermediaries will 
therefore have an even more important part to play than they did in the past with 
structured settlements, for then they were often involved only at a late stage. The 
financial projections of these experts concerning the extent that the lump sum will be 
eroded compared to the constant value of the periodical payments will be crucial in 
determining the form of the award, and the opinion will now be given at an early stage 
in the proceedings. 
One area of uncertainty is the level of damages below which it might not be 
worthwhile to move towards a periodic award because its size may not merit the time 
and trouble involved. Under the old rules the court had to be satisfied that a structured 
settlement had been considered by the parties in any case involving damages for future 
                                                 
40 Practice Direction 41B 1 (1). 
41 A few large firms of personal injury solicitors do have their own authorised investment division. 
These firms might have a financial incentive to settle via a lump sum and continue to advise the 
claimant upon investment. Of course, this arrangement should only be made if it is in the best interest 
of the client. 
42 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 r 41.6. J. Stone and A. Sands, “Periodical Payments: The Need for a 
Pragmatic Approach” (2005) 15 (5) PI Focus 18. 
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loss of £500,000 or more.43 However, for a periodical payment under the new rules 
Ministers concluded that the size of an award should not be the determining factor. 
Perhaps they had in mind the experience of the USA, where structured settlements 
have become commonplace even at damages levels below £100,000. Instead of setting 
a damages threshold, therefore, Government have left the court to assess only whether 
arranging the award in a new form might involve disproportionate effort.44 Although 
in theory any award of future loss could therefore be paid periodically, in practice a 
PPO will be less appropriate in certain types of claim. For example, although there is 
nothing to prevent a court imposing an order no matter what the age of the claimant, 
the objection of an elderly person to being paid periodically might be expected to have 
more force given the shorter duration of the payments.45   
Another factor affecting the level at which a PPO may be made and the extent they 
will be used is that, in most serious injury cases, the claimant should be left with a 
contingency lump sum fund to meet unexpected needs. It is essential that this element 
of flexibility exists to safeguard the future, even though it is not mentioned in the 
legislation.46 There are fears that judges will not take it into account sufficiently.47  
                                                 
43 Former Practice Direction 21 para 6.4. The practice of the NHS was to consider a structure in any 
case having a minimum value of £250,000. 
44 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Guidance on Periodical Payments (April, 2005) para 9. 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/pubs/pps-guidance-final.pdf   
45 The life expectancy of the claimant is mentioned as a factor in Explanatory Note 356 to the Courts 
Act 2003, but is not referred to elsewhere. Of course, age does not prevent making a PPO as 
illustrated by a case involving a 78 year old claimant in McDermott v North Cheshire Hospitals NHS 
Trust (2005) 15 (7) PI Focus 25. 
46 Contrast the guidance given in the old Practice Note (Structured Settlements) [1992] 1 All ER 862, 
para 6 (v). 
47 N. Leech (2005) 10 Legal & Medical 25: “An enthusiastic judge with possibly little training on these 
changes, in what is a huge culture shift, may impose an order … that leaves the claimant short-
changed on the contingency fund.” The dangers are emphasised by the Master of the Court of 
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Capital may be needed not only to buy and adapt accommodation, but also to care for 
the claimant, for example, in the event of the unexpected death or divorce of his carer 
spouse. Capital might also be needed if care costs outpace price inflation, as discussed 
below. For structured settlements in the past, on average, only about half of the award 
was used to arrange the periodic payments. The remainder was accounted for by 
interim payments, the capital needed to discharge debts and pay for immediate 
purchases, and the contingency fund.48 Will judges take a similar approach? 
One area of concern with regard to when an order may be made is whether the 
award of damages is to be reduced for contributory negligence.49 This may not 
become apparent until a late stage in the proceedings, and yet it could be crucial in 
influencing the financial advisor as to the form of the award. If there is to be a 
reduction in damages, a PPO may not then be enough to pay the cost of the claimant’s 
immediate nursing needs. It might then be thought better to award a lump sum. 
Although that payment is more likely to be exhausted earlier if not within the tax 
shelter provided by periodical payments, it may be preferable for this to occur and for 
the claimant’s actual needs to be met for only a short time, rather than leaving a 
permanently inadequate source of funds to offer insufficient protection against needs 
which have yet to occur. 
“BOTTOM UP” ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS IRRESPECTIVE OF COST 
                                                                                                                                            
Protection, D. Lush, “Damages for Personal Injury: Why Some Claimants Prefer a Conventional 
Lump Sum to Periodical Payments” (2005) 1 (2) London Law Rev 187 at 191. 
48 R. Lewis, op cit n 1 para 9-66 et seq where the factors affecting the size of the contingency fund are 
examined in detail. 
49 It is very difficult to analyse the effect of the defence of contributory negligence in practice upon the 
overall system because the parties need not agree whether and to what extent the defence is a factor 
in the final settlement. However, it was thought to be the cause of the reduction in damages in a 
quarter of all settlements studied by D. Harris et al, Compensation And Support For Illness And 
Injury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) 91. See also Pleasance op cit n 30 at 52. The Law 
Commission found at least 12 per cent of recipients of damages awards considered that the defence 
had been relevant in reducing their payments. See Report No 225, Personal Injury Compensation: 
How Much Is Enough? (1994) table 407. 
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Where periodical payments are thought appropriate, the court is required to make a 
fundamental change in the way that it calculates damages: instead of a “top down” it 
must adopt a “bottom up” approach,50  thereby focusing more precisely upon the 
claimant’s needs. The more familiar top down approach begins only after arriving at 
the traditional lump sum. It then calculates the income stream which can be derived 
from that capital, and this can be used to assess whether it will meet the claimant’s 
annual needs. A common reason for rejecting a structured settlement in the past was 
that the periodical payments resulting from an annuity purchase did not meet these 
needs. This top down approach does not avoid the most serious criticisms made of 
lump sums: the need to forecast how long the payments will be required, and the rate 
of return, after taxation and inflation, which could be obtained from investment of the 
lump sum. In particular, the claimant’s life expectancy is usually an element in 
estimating how long the payments will be required. The lump sum will reflect the 
compromises necessary in making these uncertain forecasts. It is usually only after the 
lump sum has been calculated using these traditional methods that it is used in a 
structured settlement to transfer, from the claimant to an insurer, the risk of the 
claimant living beyond his estimated life expectancy. This is usually achieved by the 
liability insurer using the compromised lump sum to purchase annuities from a life 
office to provide a stream of periodical payments for as long as the claimant actually 
lives, not merely the time he is expected to live. Structures, therefore, usually involve 
only changing the form of payment after the parties have gone through the traditional 
approach and, as a result, they retain many of the disadvantages of the lump sum. 
By contrast, for a PPO the new legislation requires a bottom up approach. Unlike 
top down, this does not require the lump sum to be calculated at all. Instead, 
irrespective of the capital cost, the court assesses the periodical payments the claimant 
needs for the future. These payments do not have to be multiplied to take account of 
the speculative estimates of life expectancy or projected investment returns. Unlike 
under the traditional form of payment, it is the defendant who is burdened with these 
risks and thus exposed to an uncertain future liability. When making a PPO the court 
                                                 
50 Lewis op cit n 1 para 9-10 et seq. 
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must specify the annual amounts payable, and sub-divide the award to distinguish loss 
of earnings from the costs of care and the recurring capital costs.51 The court must 
also state at what intervals the payments are to be made, and state the amounts, at 
current value, of the recurrent costs. The periodical payments will then be indexed to 
guard against inflation. The risks that arise which relate to both the investment return 
and the longevity of the claimant are thus entirely transferred to the defendant. 
In total a complex budget for life may be needed, and there is great pressure to “get 
it right.”52 Detailed planning of the claimant’s future is encouraged by allowing the 
payments to increase in steps, or even decrease.53 However, these variations in 
payment can only take place if the court specifies in the original order precise dates 
for the changes to take effect. The court is encouraged to plan for a variety of factors 
including those affecting earnings (the claimant ceasing to work, or gaining a 
promotional increase in pay); and affecting care (loss of the existing gratuitous carers, 
changes in the medical condition). Allowance can also be made for other types of 
factors such as a change in educational circumstances, perhaps leading to the claimant 
adopting a more independent, but expensive, lifestyle.  
 The crucial difference from previous practice is that the court is not concerned 
with the lump sum cost of providing for these needs. Nor does it have to speculate to 
the same extent about for how long there will still be such need. Clairvoyant estimates 
of how long the claimant will live, for example, are made redundant. Unlike under the 
traditional calculation, there is no place for the ‘Ogden Tables.’54 That is, multipliers 
and discount rates are otiose: no multiplier is required to reflect the period of years of 
the loss in order to convert it into an immediate capital amount; and no discount rate 
                                                 
51 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 r 41.8 (1) as amended by SI 2004 No 3129. 
52 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 125, Structured Settlements and Interim and Provisional 
Damages (1992) para 3.19. 
53 Practice Direction 41B para 2.2. 
54 Government Actuary’s Department, Actuarial Tables For Use In Personal Injury And Fatal Accident 
Cases (London: The Stationery Office, 5th ed 2004). 
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is needed to convert the future stream of financial losses into a capital sum 
representing present day values. The discount rate, in particular, has operated harshly 
against claimants in the past. Now defendants will not be able to take advantage of the 
artificial estimates on investment returns offered by the discount rate in order to limit 
damages. They will be ordered to provide the annual sums, indexed to rise with 
inflation, irrespective of what it might cost them as a capital sum to make such 
provision. Furthermore, they will usually be ordered to make these payments for an 
uncertain period – the rest of the claimant’s life. 
Again it is crucial to return to what effect the power to make such an award will 
have upon bargaining between the parties. As already suggested, the move towards 
imposing an uncertain liability upon defendants will strengthen the claimant’s hand. 
But how will the mechanics of making the deal be affected? In particular, for costs 
purposes, how is it to be determined whether offers to settle made by either of the 
parties are reasonable when one of them is based on the traditional lump sum, and the 
other partly on an assessment of the claimant’s annual needs? In complex cases there 
could be a mixture of approaches depending upon different care regimes and earnings 
losses. How is the court to assess the reasonableness of the rejection of a periodical 
payments offer if it is not based on its capital value but on wider social and family 
reasons? It would be a matter of considerable concern if the new form of damages 
were seriously to impede the ability of the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement 
by using the present Part 36 procedures and making payments into court. Less than 
two per cent of personal injury cases are determined by a court at present; if the 
number were to double, considerable problems could be caused for the administration 
of civil justice. To avoid this and to reduce the potential uncertainty when offers are 
made the Civil Procedure Rules now specify what any offer involving periodical 
payments must include.55 Costs consequences follow if the court judgement is not 
“more advantageous” than the party’s offer. However, what may constitute an 
advantage is not specified amid the myriad of concerns which the parties may have 
about offers based on periodical payments. The rules have been left vague and there is 
                                                 
55 Civil Procedure (Amendment No 3) Rules 2004 (SI No 3129) inserting the new Rule 36.2A. 
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much scope here for clever tactics from skilled litigators.56 It remains to be seen 
whether the broad discretion given to the court as to costs will be further used to 
encourage litigants to negotiate on a periodical payments basis. The attitude and 
training of the judiciary will be crucial in determining the long-term success of the 
new provisions.57 
VARIATION OF AWARDS: FUTURE NEEDS IGNORED? 
If the insurer is to continue to make payments into the future, and increased 
emphasis is placed upon planning for the claimant’s needs, what if those needs 
change? To what extent will the defendant be required to find further monies because 
of the change in circumstances? This was a potential reform which caused insurers’ 
considerable concern, and they argued strongly against the court being given any 
extensive powers to revise an award. Considerable difficulties could be caused not 
only for insurers in having to keep open their files and set reserves for uncertain 
liabilities many years after the original injury, but also for courts in determining 
whether the injury continued to be a cause of the claimant’s present needs.58 The new 
legislation reflects these worries by severely limiting the grounds for review. 
However, it also encourages the awarding of stepped payments to cater for future 
                                                 
56 APIL, Periodical Payments and Part 36: A Response (14/04 2004) fears that the uncertainty 
introduced make it difficult for lawyers to advise their clients, and claimants will be unfairly 
disadvantaged. The Master of the Court of Protection, has recognised wide reasons for resisting a 
lump sum for they could be “not simply financial but extend across a much broader range of 
considerations – medical, social and personal – and more holistic insofar as they treat the claimant as 
a member of a family rather than in isolation.” D. Lush, “Damages for Personal Injury: Why Some 
Claimants Prefer a Lump Sum to Periodical Payments” (2005) 1 (2) London Law Rev 187 at 203, 
(previously a paper delivered to the Common Law and Commercial Bar Association, April 2005). 
57 The guidance given to the judiciary to date contributes little to the debate on the contentious issues 
and merely summarises the relevant legislation. An updated version of the Judicial Studies Board 
Civil Benchbook is not expected to resolve matters. 
58 For these and other reasons the Law Commission rejected review in relation to voluntary structured 
settlements in Structured Settlements and Interim and Provisional Damages (1994, Report No 224) 
para 3.85. 
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changes. These two approaches to future payments are clearly distinguished in the two 
sub-headings below. 
Traditionally the lump sum award has been seen as putting an end to litigation. In 
particular, the idea that a court could impose a continuing obligation to make 
reparation upon a defendant was considered in 1927 to be “quite improper and 
illegal.”59 Since that date the finality of the award of damages has largely been 
preserved, although it is subject to the following three exceptions: 
Firstly, a structured settlement can be devised to create a continuing liability to 
make periodical payments. Structures still exist, although the terminology has been 
removed from the legislation. However, as we have seen, the “top down” approach to 
a structure merely converts the traditional lump sum into a series of payments, and 
does not require the addition of any more money than that envisaged in the original 
settlement. It therefore makes no difference to the structure that the claimant’s needs 
unexpectedly increase over time. No variation of the pre-set payments is allowed, and 
insurers have therefore not had to face any later review of the settlement. 
Secondly, interim awards constitute a limited move away from the once-and-for-all 
system by allowing a claimant to obtain some compensation while waiting for final 
settlement or the full trial of his action to take place. The procedure is of particular 
value where a period of time is required for the claimant’s medical condition to 
stabilise before a firm prognosis can be made about his future needs. Successive 
awards can be made, although interim payments are limited to a reasonable proportion 
of the damages to which the claimant would be entitled at trial. Again, no variation of 
payment is allowed after trial or final settlement. 
                                                 
59 Fournier v Canadian National Railways [1927] AC 167. 
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Finally, a potentially more radical change was introduced in 1985 when the 
claimant was allowed to obtain a provisional damages order from the court.60 This 
enables the claimant to return for more money if there is a chance that his medical 
condition will deteriorate. However, severe limits are imposed. The chance must be 
substantial not merely fanciful. The additional compensation can then only be 
obtained on one further occasion and only if there has been deterioration in the 
particular way foreseen and specified by the court when making its first award. The 
mere fact that the claimant is in need of greater care or has suffered a general or 
continuing deterioration will not suffice to trigger a review. Instead the deterioration 
must be “clear and severable” and correspond to that precisely anticipated by the 
court. 
The procedure is especially useful as a form of protection against catastrophe in the 
form of an unlikely, but possible, severe deterioration in the claimant’s condition. The 
most common example of the use of the order is with regard to the risk of developing 
epilepsy after suffering a head injury. Even in such cases orders have been sought 
infrequently, partly because formal resort to court is required. A total of only 450 
orders were obtained in the two million personal injury cases settled in the three years 
from 2000.61 However, in negotiations claimants have threatened to use this procedure 
somewhat more frequently in order to strengthen their hand. The threat is made to take 
advantage of the desire of insurers to close the file and avoid exposure to an uncertain 
liability. Claimants hope to increase the lump sum on offer. In this respect, as 
analysed above, there are clear parallels to be drawn between the effects on the 
bargaining process of provisional damages, on the one hand, and the new powers to 
order periodical payments, on the other. 
                                                 
60 Supreme Court Act s 32A as amended by the Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 6. See part 41 of 
the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 and D. Brennan, Provisional Damages (London: Legal Studies and 
Services, 1986). 
61 This is less than 0.03 per cent of the settlements recorded by the Compensation Recovery Unit. See 
Department for Constitutional Affairs, Variation of Periodical Payment Orders and Settlements in 
Personal Injury Cases: Partial Regulatory Impact Assessment (April, 2004).  
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a) Variable periodical payments orders 
The new legislation, in effect, enables the provisional damages rules which have 
been used for lump sums to be applied to periodical payments orders.62 The payments 
can be varied and, if necessary, a further lump sum can be sought. The limited 
grounds for variation are almost the same as those for provisional damages described 
above. In particular, unforeseen medical changes are excluded because of the high 
level of uncertainty and potential costs involved. Nor is review to lie if there are 
unforeseen life-changing circumstances even if these are exceptional.63 Ministers 
therefore expect variable orders to be sought infrequently.64 
However, the grounds for variation have been extended in one important respect. 
Apart from taking account of the possibility of deterioration in the claimant’s physical 
or mental condition, judges may now also allow a variation if there is a chance of a 
significant improvement in the condition in the future. Previously there had been 
concern that this might hinder rehabilitation: whether as a result of malingering or 
because of the subconscious effect, the claimant may not improve if there is a 
financial penalty for doing so. This possibility has now given way to the more even-
handed approach of allowing for both deterioration and improvement. The bargaining 
position of defendants has thus been slightly improved. After all, a claimant will not 
relish the prospect of being spied upon later in life to see if his medical condition has 
changed. However, because insurers wish to bring proceedings to a close, it is 
doubtful whether they will drive a case to court to secure this power of review except 
                                                 
62 Damages Act 1996 s 2B as substituted by the Courts Act s 100 and supplemented by the Damages 
(Variation of Periodical Payments) Order 2005 (SI No 841). 
63 As suggested by the Lord Chancellor’s Department, Damages for Future Loss (Consultation Paper 
CP 01/02, March 2002) para 70, and supported by a number of respondents (CP (R) 01/02) 22. These 
included APIL in its Response to the Lord Chancellor’s Consultation Paper (May, 2002) and 
Response to the Draft Damages (Variation of Periodical Payments) Order 2004 (06/04, 2004). 
64 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Guidance on Periodical Payments (April, 2005) para 11. 
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in the most extreme cases and only if considerable improvement in a specific way is 
anticipated. 
b) Non-variable but stepped orders  
In planning for the claimant’s future the court is encouraged to anticipate events 
which will increase, or even decrease, the need for compensation. It can then order 
that payments be changed, or ‘stepped’, at the specific dates in the future at which it 
forecasts that these changes will need to be made. In a Practice Direction,65 the court 
has been given examples of when a stepped order might be considered appropriate. 
These include where it anticipates that the claimant’s earnings will change, or where it 
considers that it will be necessary to revise the amount of care required. Similarly, 
provision can be made for changes in future medical costs or for recurrent capital 
costs. However, in all cases the court must state the specific dates and amounts by 
which the payments should be varied. 
Unlike under a variable order, the increase or decrease resulting from a stepped 
provision can be made at the later date without any further involvement of the court. 
A second difference is that the change in payment takes place irrespective of whether 
the anticipated event giving rise to it actually occurs. There is no later review, only 
guesswork in advance as to what the claimant will require in the future. This requires 
the same crystal ball gazing as when a lump sum is awarded. Windfall increases can 
therefore occur when the need does not later materialise, and conversely, under-
compensation will result if a new need is not anticipated. The precision in the court 
order is the enemy of flexibility and later need. 
Overall, whether involving variable or stepped payments, there has only been a 
very limited departure from the traditional rule that awards are not subject to later 
review. The emphasis upon the claimant’s future needs is therefore strictly time-
limited: needs are of concern at the date of trial only, and generally not thereafter. 
INDEXATION OF PAYMENTS: PRICES OR EARNINGS? 
                                                 
65 Practice Direction 41B para 2.2. 
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One of the major advantages to a claimant of a PPO is that the payments specified 
will increase in the future to protect against the potential ravages of inflation. 
Claimants will not see their damages eroded as they have in the past when the value of 
the income arising from the lump sum was reduced by economic circumstances 
beyond the control of the average investor. Instead, the periodical payments are to be 
treated as varying in accordance with the Retail Prices Index (RPI).66 This is a major 
attraction in applying for a PPO. Insurers have particular difficulties, described under 
the next heading, in meeting the open-ended commitments involved. Indexation is 
therefore a key feature in strengthening the claimant’s bargaining position, and it 
would be improved further if an index higher than RPI were to be used. The 
legislation appears to make this possible because it empowers a court to depart from 
RPI where circumstances make it appropriate to do so.67 However, no indication is 
given of what these circumstances might be.68 The first test case litigation concerning 
the new payments regime is with regard to these provisions.69 When will a court 
depart from RPI and adopt another index? This issue is of considerable importance to 
the level of damages and to the future of the tort system. 
The immediate concern of claimants is that using the RPI will almost certainly 
under-compensate them for their future cost of care. There are various arguments 
based on the increasing costs of medical treatment, equipment and appliances, but the 
early focus of the litigation is upon the future earnings of carers. In general, for at least 
the past sixty years, earnings have exceeded prices by an average of about two per 
                                                 
66 An attempt by the NHS to pay less than RPI because of potential local authority support in later years 
failed in Walton v Calderdale Healthcare NHS Trust [2005] EWHC 1053 [2005] Ll Rep Med. 398. 
67 Damages Act 1996 s 2 (8) and (9) as amended by the Courts Act 2003 s 100. 
68 Para 354 of the Explanatory Notes to the Courts Act merely states that it is expected that RPI will be 
used in the great majority of cases. A first draft referred to a different index being adopted only in 
“exceptional” circumstances, but this was controversial and was later changed to “appropriate” 
circumstances. 
69 The application to strike out the claim was dismissed in Flora v Wakom Ltd [2005] All ER (D) 117 
(Dec) [2005] EWHC 2822 and it is expected to be fully argued early in 2006. 
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cent a year.70 If this difference can also be shown to apply to care workers and that it 
is likely to continue in the future, then damages awarded for care and based on the RPI 
will be insufficient in the longer term.71 If costs exceed RPI by 2 per cent a year, after 
twenty years RPI linked payments will meet only two thirds of the care costs; after 35 
years they will meet only half; and after sixty years only one third.72 As a result 
actuaries acting for medical insurance companies commonly allow for indices for the 
cost of care or hospitalisation to exceed RPI.73 
Although on the surface there appears to be strong arguments for departing from 
the RPI in relation to care costs, there are practical difficulties in setting an alternative 
and, more importantly, there are profound problems of principle for the tort system. 
The practical difficulties involve selecting alternative indices and relevant time 
periods. For example, over what period are rates to be studied to establish historic 
patterns to illustrate the potential impact of different indices? Which indices are to be 
used when different earnings figures can be derived from the likes of, firstly, local 
authority based rates of pay for carers, secondly, the British Nursing Association 
recommended rates for carers, and thirdly, Government annual figures of average 
                                                 
70 Government Actuary’s Department, Actuarial Tables For Use In Personal Injury And Fatal Accident 
Cases (London: The Stationery Office, 5th ed 2004) (The Ogden Tables) Appendix A para 12: “Real 
earnings growth … has averaged 1.5 to 2 per cent a year more than growth in the RPI.” 
71 R. Hogg, “Will Periodical Payments Provide Adequately for the Costs of Care?” [2004] J Personal 
Injury Law 209, and contrast W. Norris, “Periodical Payments: Indexation, Variation, Protection and 
Practice” [2005] J Personal Injury Law 59 with a reply by R. de Wilde at [2005] J Personal Injury 
Law 147. According to Lush, op cit n 56 at 192, in Beattie v Secretary of State for Social Security 
[2001] Ll Rep Med 297, between 1992 and 2004 the claimant’s annuity rose by 35 per cent whereas 
his care costs rose by 60 per cent in line with average earnings. He is now unable to afford the care 
package he needs.  
72 Hogg op cit at 213. This is confirmed by the mathematics of another example: with inflation at 2.5 
per cent, an indexed award of £10,000 pays out £20,975 after 30 years whereas an earnings-related 
award at 2 per cent above RPI would pay out £37,500 a year. This represents a shortfall of 44 per 
cent, and a cumulative deficit of £171,000. 
73 The Ogden Tables Appendix A para 6. 
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earnings for many different sections of the workforce? There are a range of 
possibilities.74 However, a suggestion that a fixed percentage above the RPI should be 
used75 appears to have been abandoned. 
The wider problems of principle that result from a move away from RPI focus 
upon the disparity that would then exist between periodical payments and lump sums, 
and the implications for assessing damages for lost earning themselves. In Cooke v 
United Bristol Healthcare76 the Court of Appeal, in effect, refused to depart from RPI 
when assessing a lump sum to compensate for the future loss. The award was to be 
calculated by establishing the real rate of return on the investments which could be 
obtained from early receipt of compensation in the form of an immediate lump sum. 
For this the appropriate discount rate was 2.5 per cent, as specified by the Lord 
Chancellor under the Damages Act 1996. This assumed real rate of return on 
investment was set after allowance not only for taxation on the income that arises, but 
also for inflation in the form of increases in the RPI.77 The Court of Appeal rejected 
the challenge to the Lord Chancellor’s set rate even though there might be evidence 
that care costs had increased above RPI and would continue to do so. It was seen as 
“an illegitimate attempt to subvert the Lord Chancellor’s discount rate.” However, the 
                                                 
74 There are a variety of inflation indices already in use to manage health service efficiency. They 
include a pay cost index and a health services cost index. See L. Curtis and A. Netten, Unit Costs of 
Health and Social Care 2005 (Canterbury: University of Kent, 2005). 
http://www.pssru.ac.uk/uc/uc2005contents.htm 
75 Hogg op cit, and APIL, Periodical Payments: An Assessment of Concerns and Solutions (March 
2004). 
76 [2004] 1 All ER 797. See also the earlier attempt to adduce evidence in Warriner v Warriner [2002] 
EWCA Civ 81 [2003] 3 All ER 447. In Patel (Bhawesh) v Wright [2005] EWHC 347, rather than 
preventing an increase in the multiplier, Cooke was applied to prevent it from being reduced to take 
into account an anticipated fall in the future cost of video telephone calls. 
77 Many recipients of lump sum damages are higher rate taxpayers on the income that arises with the 
result that the rate of return they must earn is 4.6 per cent plus RPI. 
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decision has already been severely attacked for being based on “specious grounds,”78 
and if PPOs were now to be indexed at a different rate, it is certain that Cooke would 
be subject to challenge.  
If departure from the index were to be justified to take account of earnings when 
assessing care costs, it would be difficult to see where the argument might stop and 
where RPI would actually be used. In particular, it appears logical to extend the 
argument to the calculation of damages for the loss of future earnings themselves. At 
present the claimant’s damages are frozen at the date of trial or settlement, and no 
allowance is made for the anticipated rise in the standard of living which all workers 
are expected to enjoy in the future.79 This seriously limits the size of the damages 
award,80 and gives the lie to the avowed tort objective of returning the claimant to the 
pre-accident position. However, if the limit were removed, there would be extremely 
serious consequences for insurers and premium payers, as well as for Government and 
especially the NHS. 
The following example illustrates the extent that damages would increase if there 
were to be a departure from the RPI. It looks at various potential multipliers required 
to compensate a 20 year old man suffering a pecuniary loss for life. Using table 1 of 
the Ogden tables and applying the present 2.5 per cent discount rate, the current 
multiplier lawyers would use to apply to the annual loss is 31.3. However, if we take 
the Government actuary’s view81 that the true returns on investment after taxation and 
                                                 
78 R. de Wilde op cit n 71 at 157. 
79 P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (London: Butterworths, 6th ed 1999) 133. Of 
course, allowance is made for the higher wages resulting from prospects of promotion, but not for the 
increases that might be expected because of the rise in living standards.  
80 For examples of its effect see R. Lewis, R. McNabb and V. Wass op cit n 19. 
81  Chris Daykin, “From Lump Sums to Periodical Payments and Beyond” (2005) a paper presented to a 
conference at the Institute of Actuaries, March 2005. The market at that time implied a return of 1.8 
per cent but this was before any deduction for tax. In issuing new RPI linked gilts on behalf of 
Government in September 2005 the Debt Management Office used a discount rate of 1.25 per cent. 
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RPI inflation are such that the discount rate should be nearer 1.5 per cent this would 
increase the multiplier to 40.2. If we then suppose that health care costs will rise at say 
1 per cent above RPI, then the discount rate becomes 0.5 per cent and the 
corresponding multiplier is 53.7. Finally, if we then allow for earnings to rise at say 
1.5 per cent over RPI the discount rate is 0 per cent and the multiplier increases to 
63.8. In effect, this means that moving to an earnings-based assessment instead of 
prices could double the amount of damages that can be claimed for the future loss. 
If we put this in a historical context the increase in damages becomes even more 
pronounced. Six years ago the discount rate stood at 4.5 per cent where it had been 
fixed for the previous thirty years. It used to be conventional wisdom, reflected in the 
Ogden Tables, that even with regard to a youngest claimant suffering an injury, the 
effects of which would last for life, the multiplier would not exceed the low 20’s. 
Using that figure as the baseline it can be seen that damages today for future loss have 
increased by 50 per cent and involve multipliers in the 30’s. If allowance were to be 
made for a rise in earnings instead of prices the increase in damages will be threefold 
and the multiplier in the 60’s. The indexation of periodical payments therefore has 
widespread implications for the level of damages in general and the eventual cost to 
society of the tort system. 
PROBLEMS FOR DEFENDANTS: THE TRUE COSTS 
Insurers are faced with a variety of technical and administrative problems as a 
result of the new legislation. These include keeping files open for very many years, 
and setting reserves to comply with regulatory requirements when future liability is so 
uncertain. A particular difficulty is the effect of liability to make continuing payments 
upon reinsurance treaties. A liability insurer might offset the risk of paying high 
awards by reinsuring liability above a certain threshold. This can affect cases as low as 
£500,000, although a common level for medium sized companies is around £2 
million. No problems are caused where a lump sum is paid because the level which 
                                                                                                                                            
As noted in the introduction to the Ogden Tables op cit n 70 para 15, the Lord Chancellor’s discount 
rate has never been within 0.5 per cent of the correct rate of return. 
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triggers the involvement of the re-insurer is clear. However, how is the threshold to 
apply where periodical payments are involved,82 and who is to benefit if the payments 
decrease because the claimant’s medical condition has improved? 
The focus of this article is not upon these administrative problems, difficult though 
they may be, but upon the crucial issue of the cost of the changes. It is argued here that 
defendants will have to pay substantially more to fund a PPO than a traditional lump 
sum, and that Government failed to anticipate this. The regulatory impact assessment 
for the legislation argued that the reforms “would not materially increase the value of 
claims,”83 even suggesting that liability insurers might save 4 per cent by purchasing 
annuities rather than using lump sums. This is far from the case, and the suggestion 
that there were savings to be made came as a shock to those with knowledge of the 
compensation industry: it was based upon “spurious assumptions.”84 The policy 
implications of the reforms must be looked at afresh. 
To understand why the regulatory impact assessment was so very wide of the mark 
we must consider how most compensators will provide for their liability to make 
index-linked payments for an uncertain time and for an unknown total cost. Liability 
insurers will almost always fund PPOs by purchasing annuities from a life insurer. A 
possible alternative method open to large composite insurers is to self-fund the 
payments by using the facilities of their own life offices, but there is little enthusiasm 
                                                 
82 The International Underwriting Association in London has proposed revisions to reinsurance clauses 
and has suggested a new capitalisation clause to allow reinsurers to settle claims involving periodical 
payments. However, most reinsurance treaties on renewal to date have left the matter open. G. 
Carpenter, “Payment of Bodily Injury Claims” (2005) 183 Liability Risk and Insurance 17. 
83 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Courts Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessment (November, 2002) para 
25. 
84 See the views of Nick Leech of the leading structured settlement intermediary, Frenkel Topping, in 
“The Good, the Bad, and the Imposition!” a paper made available to the Legal Wales Conference, 
September 2003: “Generally the Regulatory Impact Assessment relies upon spurious assumptions, 
often without hard evidence to back-up the stated opinion, being that favouring imposition. It 
demonstrates poor understanding of the total personal injury marketplace….”  
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for this,85 and in the past it was almost never done for structured settlements. Unlike 
insurers, public bodies are able to self-fund the payments from their own resources 
because they are able to satisfy the security requirement in the legislation. The main 
public body acting as a defendant is the NHS and it has insisted upon self-funding all 
payments in recent years. However, most defendants other than these public bodies 
will be forced into the annuity market to fund PPOs. This could prove difficult and 
very expensive for them because there are only a small number of suitable financial 
products available and only at a high cost. 
There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, there is little competition in the market 
to provide annuities for tort claimants. This has the effect of making quotations less 
keen than, for example, in the USA where there are at least fifteen annuity providers. 
By contrast in this country, at the end of 2003 there was a real danger that there would 
be no life offices involved at all. This would have completely undermined the planned 
reforms. Fortunately, a couple of new providers have now emerged but the market 
remains fragile.86 Life offices are deterred because few such annuities are sought, the 
market being of almost no significance compared to that for annuities for retirement 
pensions. There is a marked contrast with the £6 billion a year spent on structured 
settlements in the USA. Another discouraging factor is the particular difficulty of 
                                                 
85 However, because of the high price of annuities, a couple of general insurers have recently self-
funded settlements even though they have no life offices and in spite of the resulting difficulties in 
setting reserves and complying with regulatory requirements. If this were to continue on an extensive 
basis the Financial Services Authority would be certain to take interest in the solvency issues that 
arise. 
86 The volatile life market was analysed in Lewis op cit n 1 chapter 11. Windsor Life and NFU Mutual 
were responsible for four out of five such settlements in the five years to 2003. However, both 
companies together with Scottish Widows withdrew from the market in 2003. Fortunately AIG, 
Canada Life, and Partnership Assurance have since taken their place, and there are rumours of others 
that are interested. For the recent history of providers see Kemp and Kemp, The Quantum of 
Damages vol 1 at 22-061.  
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underwriting annuities for the “impaired lives” of many of the injured claimants.87 
When there is only limited experience of the effect of injury on life expectancy, 
underwriting becomes far more an art than a science, and a miscalculated gamble can 
prove costly. As a result the market is limited, premiums have fluctuated widely, and 
the cost of annuities is high. Yet it remains of crucial importance to the future of 
PPOs, and the Government has been urged to intervene to stabilise matters.88 
The second factor which drives up the cost of annuities is linking them to increases 
in the RPI. This results in regulatory restrictions being imposed upon the providers. 
The life offices are required by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to meet their 
solvency requirements by providing assets which closely match their liabilities. In 
practice this means that, to fund RPI annuities, they have been forced to purchase 
index-linked gilts issued by the Government. These are expensive to buy, the market 
for them being dominated by pension funds anxious to meet their own statutory 
obligations to obtain matching funds for their index-linked returns. In addition, 
Government has made all too few of these gilts available to the market.89 Because of 
the high demand and the limited provision the yields have been very low. In turn, this 
means that the RPI annuity rates offered by providers are poor value. Where the top 
down approach is used to arrange a settlement they make it difficult to ensure that the 
periodical payments derived from the traditional lump sum will meet all of the 
claimant’s needs. With bottom up arrangements under a PPO, defendants can now be 
                                                 
87 Lewis op cit n 1 para 11-28 et seq. It has been suggested that the lack of data held by UK insurers on 
impaired lives means that they may have adopted conservative life expectancy estimates, again 
leading towards lower annuity returns. However, data is available from linked North American 
companies and other sources. 
88 For example, APIL have asked that relevant discussion between the Department of Trade and the 
Department for Constitutional Affairs be given higher priority. APIL, Periodical Payments: An 
Assessment of Concerns and Solutions (March 2004). 
89 The first issue of these gilts was in 1982, and the last but one was in 2002 with a final date for 
redemption in 2035. Government was repeatedly urged by insurers, APIL and others to issue more 
gilts, and it eventually complied in September 2005 when it made available a new issue with a 
maturity date of 2055. The issue was immediately over-subscribed. 
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forced to make RPI linked periodical payments whatever the cost. If they do not self-
fund, they will be forced to purchase annuities in this limited market. This will prove 
very expensive for them. 
 Matters could get worse. If the court were to adopt an index which exceeded RPI 
insurers would not be able to purchase any financial product in the market which 
would be guaranteed to match their liabilities.90 The extent of their reserves would 
then come under close scrutiny from the FSA. That regulator is likely to prevent 
insurers from assuming long-term liabilities tied to increases in earnings rather than 
prices. In contrast, Government bodies are not subject to the same financial services 
regulation, and are free to self-fund payments without scrutiny of their methods or 
their reserves. The overall result for liability insurers is that it will be much more 
expensive to purchase annuities to fund the payments under a periodical payment 
order than to hand over the traditional lump sum. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
cost of these settlements has increased by as much as a quarter or even a third, and 
insurance reserves have been revised accordingly.91 One QC has suggested that the 
PPO regime 
                                                 
90 However, one product involving a non-RPI flexible annuity (similar to a drawdown pension) has been 
developed by Canada Life, and was approved by the FSA in July 2005. It has been used in a number 
of settlements where periodic payments are agreed and not ordered by a court. It was also used where 
the settlement required judicial consent in Day v Alexander (2005) 15 (7) PI Focus 24, but approval 
has yet to be sought for its use in a PPO under the new legislation. Previously a with profits policy 
was developed by NFU but it has now been withdrawn. See Lewis op cit n 16 at 300. These products 
allow some exposure to the equity market and offer a guaranteed minimum income which appears 
extremely attractive in securing future care costs compared to RPI linked annuities. However, they 
probably can only be obtained outside of the PPO legislative structure, and this gives the parties an 
incentive to settle privately. 
91 M. Hardman, “Periodical Payments: A Defendant Lawyer’s Perspective,” paper presented to a 
conference at the Institute of Actuaries, March 2005. 
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“is going to cost insurers, both directly and indirectly, a lot more money 
and expense to service these damages. I do not believe that they have, as 
yet, appreciated the extent of their troubles.”92 
One case that was settled privately on an RPI basis illustrates this. If settlement had 
been based upon the traditional lump sum the multiplier would have been 29. 
However, funding RPI periodical payments in effect increased the capital sum need to 
purchase the annuities such that the corresponding multiplier rose to 45. The cost of 
future financial loss therefore rose by 55 per cent.93  
POLITICS: THE NEEDS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE NHS 
As we have seen, there are strong arguments to support the more widespread use of 
periodical payments. Many of these focus upon the needs of claimants and the 
desirability of providing compensation equivalent to that which has been lost. On the 
surface the Government can be seen to be supporting a fairer system which helps 
ensure that compensation meets needs and is used for the purposes for which it was 
awarded. These are the only reasons for the reform recently listed by the Department 
for Constitutional Affairs.94 But if we look at the organisations that gave most support 
to the new legislation we get a different picture of the reasons why it was passed. 
The Association of Personal Injury Lawyers is a claimant lawyers’ organisation, 
very active in test case litigation and in lobbying the Government. Although generally 
in support of periodical payments as a means to ensure full compensation of victims, 
it opposed the imposition of PPOs against claimants’ wishes unless there were 
exceptional circumstances.95 Not surprisingly, insurers together with the defence 
organisation, the Forum of Insurance Lawyers, were not in favour of the reform. Nor 
                                                 
92 De Wilde op cit n 5 at 325. 
93 Details of this case must remain confidential. It must be remembered that the increase would not 
apply to the lump sum element of the damages which should form a contingency fund and be a 
substantial element in most settlements. 
94 Guidance on Periodical Payments (April, 2005) paras 6-8. 
95 APIL, Response to the Lord Chancellor’s Consultation Paper (May, 2002) 
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was change sought by the intermediaries who arrange structured settlements. Frenkel 
Topping, the innovative firm responsible for arranging the great majority of such 
deals, has been influential in previous reforms. But it opposed PPOs on the ground 
that they would unduly interfere with the consensual approach. In total, only a bare 
majority (57 per cent) of respondents to the Lord Chancellor’s consultation paper gave 
an unqualified welcome to imposition. 
Instead the catalysts for the reform lay within Government itself. Although the 
legislation was the prime responsibility of the Lord Chancellor’s Department, it had 
no enthusiasm to make the change urgently. However, both the Treasury and the 
Department of Health were keen supporters of immediate action, and they were the 
driving forces behind the sudden implementation of the enabling legislation. 
Parliamentary time was found by inserting the relevant provisions, rather 
anomalously, into a Bill dealing with criminal law and administration. Claimants’ 
interests were very much secondary to those involving public finance and the demands 
of the NHS. Far from being what they appear on the surface, the reforms in fact were 
politically driven.96 
The political and economic advantages to Government of periodical payments are 
as follows. In contrast to the problems faced by liability insurers, Government bodies 
such as the Ministry of Defence and especially the NHS will make immediate gains. 
This is because their budgets will no longer be denuded by the loss of large capital 
sums paid as damages.97 Their cash-flow will be improved because they can self-fund 
the periodical payments and they are not required to enter the expensive annuity 
market. It was forecast that in the first year of the new regime the NHS could save as 
much as £245 million out of the £330 million they would otherwise have to pay for 
                                                 
96 Similarly, Hardman op cit n 91. 
97 In 2001-02 the MOD paid out £81 million in compensation according to the National Audit Office, 
Ministry of Defence: Compensation Claims (HC 957 2002-03). By contrast, in the same year the 
NHS paid out more than five times as much, amounting to £446 million according to the Department 
of Health, Making Amends: A Consultation Paper Setting out Proposals for Reforming the Approach 
to Clinical Negligence in the NHS (2003) table at 60.  
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the larger claims.98 This cash-flow saving will continue at a diminishing rate for 24 
years until the accumulated liabilities reach, and thereafter outgrow, what would have 
been the capital sums needed to dispose of the claims entirely. In the past, damages 
awards have had dramatic effects upon individual heath care budgets: major capital 
expenditure has been deferred and even wards closed.99 At present, health trusts in 
England are running at a deficit which could reach a billion pounds at the end of the 
financial year.100 It is not therefore surprising to find that the NHS has welcomed the 
new regime, and is much more likely than liability insurers to take advantage of it by 
forcing claimants to accept periodical payments. For many years it has self-funded all 
its structured settlements, and it now self-funds all its PPOs. It refuses to buy annuities 
from outside providers. The savings in cash-flow are too good to miss.   
No matter what the short-term gains for the Treasury and the NHS, ultimately the 
taxpayer will have to pick up the total damages bill. There are at least two reasons to 
be concerned about this.101 First, the payments eventually are likely to be higher than 
they would have been if the traditional lump sums had continued to be used. This is 
because the move towards bottom up assessments irrespective of the capital cost of 
providing the index-linked periodical payments drives up the ultimate cost of an 
                                                 
98 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Courts Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessment (November, 2002) table 
14. This is based on converting into periodical payments 80 per cent of all awards over £250,000 and 
40 per cent of all awards between £100,000 and £250,000. 
99 R. Dingwall et al, Medical Negligence: A Review and a Bibliography (Oxford: Centre for Socio-
Legal Studies, 1991) 55. 
100 The Daily Telegraph, January 18, 2006, “NHS told to cut costs as Hewitt confirms spending 
squeeze”, and The Times, January 26, 2006, “NHS on critical list as cash crisis spirals.” Up to fifty 
trusts were said to have lost control of their finances. Those in most difficulty revealed they had 
closed beds, wards or entire hospitals. Others had cancelled operations, and cut staff levels. However, 
in the last three years the overall expenditure upon the NHS has grown rapidly from £65 billion in 
2002-03 to £87 billion in 2005-06. 
101 For detailed analysis of concern about the mortality risks being assumed by the NHS see Lewis op 
cit n 16 at 299. 
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award, and this will have an effect even upon those able to self-fund. Moreover, the 
tax and benefits savings made by the claimant in receiving payments in this way also 
occurs at a cost to the Exchequer. Secondly, the deferring of payments accumulates a 
debt which eventually will have to be met. The projection is that after 24 years the 
impact upon the cash-flow will be negative. That is, at that time not only will the good 
times come to an end and have to be paid for, but also there will be a real and 
increasing additional cost to the public purse. This cost may be relatively small in 
relation to the entire NHS budget, but Government finances should beware of these 
contingent liabilities, especially in the light of current concern about whether we 
should be paying more to fund future pensions in general. In effect, it will be our 
children who will have to find the money to pay for the full cost of today’s medical 
negligence, and they will need to do so whilst keeping a disproportionately aged 
population out of poverty. 
Finally, although the reforms were NHS driven, it must be remembered that 
clinical negligence comprises only a minority of claims even if attention is confined to 
serious injuries. Liability insurers remain the predominant paymasters. The NHS was 
responsible for only 11 per cent of all personal injury claims resulting in an award of 
over £100,000 in 2001-02. For claims of this size in that year liability insurers paid 
out more than over £2.26 billion, almost six times as much as the NHS’s £0.4 
billion.102 This statistic reveals how the emphasis has been misplaced. In the great 
majority of cases it will be liability insurers and premium payers who will have to bear 
the increased costs resulting from the reforms, whilst in the minority of cases, in the 
short-term, it will be the taxpayer who benefits. 
Here again changes have been made which result in an increase in tort damages but 
also transfer costs from the public to the private sphere. Insurers have recently been 
made to bear the cost of the removal of legal aid and the introduction of conditional 
fees. They now pay the claimant’s costs, including the solicitor’s success fee and the 
insurance premium against the possibility of losing. Insurers also have been required 
to pay for the cost of providing social security benefits to accident victims and, more 
                                                 
102 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Courts Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessment (November, 2002) 
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recently, for the cost of their NHS treatment.103 As a result of the present reforms they 
now must bear the brunt of further savings in public expenditure. Of course, the 
transfer results in a “stealth tax” which all premium payers and, ultimately, society at 
large must pay. Tort law, whether made by judges or Parliament, has always been 
influenced by politics in the wider sense,104 and this is especially apparent in the 
recent and continuing struggles that are taking place over damages law. 
CONCLUSION 
Giving judges the power to award damages in a form other than that sought by the 
parties is a major reform. All serious injury cases are affected by the threat of 
imposition of a periodical payment order, whether or not they eventually come to 
court. This is because the potential exercise of the power affects the bargains that are 
struck in the tort system. In addition, the reform undermines the traditional approach 
to damages, firstly, by requiring “bottom up” assessments which focus upon 
claimants’ annual needs; and, secondly, by guaranteeing that these needs will be 
satisfied no matter how long the claimant actually lives, and whatever the level of 
price inflation. These needs are to be met irrespective of the resulting lump sum cost. 
The parties must give early consideration to the form in which the damages are to be 
paid. A change is thus being sought not only in legal method, but also in the culture of 
personal injury practitioners. 
However, the effect of the legislation may be less profound and certainly much 
harder to see if it is hidden in the settlement system, and predominantly results only in 
insurers paying higher lump sums than otherwise would be the case. There is every 
                                                 
103 For recovery of social security and NHS treatment costs see R. Lewis, Deducting Benefits From 
Damages For Personal Injury (Oxford: OUP, 1999) and “Recovery of NHS Accident Costs: Tort as 
a Vehicle for Raising Public Funds” (1999) 62 Modern LR 903. Recovery has been extended by Part 
III of the Heath and Social Care (Community Health Standards) Act 2003. Hypothecation returns the 
cost of treatment to the appropriate specific hospital trust or other NHS budget. 
104 R. Lewis, “Lobbying and the Damages Act 1996: ‘Whispering in Appropriate Ears’” (1997) 60 
Modern L R 230. 
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incentive for insurers to settle privately in this way in order to avoid the cost and 
difficulty of arranging the annuity payments usually required to satisfy a PPO. The 
new legislation failed to anticipate the problems insurers have in accommodating the 
new regime within their wider financial world. Because of the difficulties, insurers 
will be keen to maintain the traditional form of settlement. 
In one way or another, the changes will result in many seriously injured claimants 
obtaining more money at the expense of insurance companies. Also to benefit from 
the legislation is one group of defendants – Government departments and public 
bodies, especially the NHS. Unlike insurers, they can self-fund the periodical 
payments and thereby retain within their budgets the capital sums they would 
otherwise have to pay. They can avoid paying for today’s liabilities until tomorrow. 
This effect upon public expenditure was not among the main reasons put forward for 
the reform. However, in exposing the true costs and benefits of the legislation, this 
article has revealed a political dimension which could easily be overlooked by the 
casual observer. Such a perspective merits further study for it can also be employed to 
analyse other recent, or anticipated, changes in tort law. In particular, the impact upon 
personal injury law of concern about litigation against the NHS has yet to be given the 
attention it deserves. 
The traditional tort textbook can leave the reader with a very misleading 
impression about how the compensation system operates in cases of personal 
injury.105 In practice, the system is transformed into something which has but a limited 
relationship to the theoretical picture portrayed. But it is not only the experience of 
practice which throws down a challenge to tort scholars; it is also changes to the basic 
rules themselves. This article is concerned with reforms which have been ignored by 
the academic community even though they undermine the tradition of awarding 
damages in a once-and-for-all lump sum. They also expose the fragility of the 
conventional claim that the aim in tort is to return the claimant, in so far as possible, 
to the position enjoyed before the accident. As such they raise fundamental questions 
                                                 
105 R. Lewis, “Insurance and the Tort System” (2005) 25 Legal Studies 85. 
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concerning the rationale and future direction of the law of tort. Who really pays, how 
much, and in what manner, are questions that will not go away.106 
                                                 
106 Cf P. S. Atiyah, “No Fault Compensation: A Question that will not Go Away” (1980) 54 Tulane Law 
Review 271. 
